mardi 28 avril 2015

Uyghur scholar's writings shed light on China's missteps


Analysis: By failing to be more tolerant, Chinese officials fomented 'chaos' in Xinjiang
<p>Armed police patrol on motorbikes along a street in Hotan, in China's western Xinjiang region, earlier this month (AFP Photo/Greg Baker)</p>
<p> </p> Armed police patrol on motorbikes along a street in Hotan, in China's western Xinjiang region, earlier this month (AFP Photo/Greg Baker)
  • Dan Long, Beijing
  • China
  • April 28, 2015
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In 2011, when high-level Chinese officials asked Uyghur scholar Ilham Tohti to write an assessment of recent troubles in restive Xinjiang, there was every reason to believe Beijing might listen.
Two years earlier, rioting in Xinjiang’s regional capital Urumqi left an estimated 197 to 600 people dead, shocking the government. In the aftermath, the central government fired senior officials in Xinjiang.
As the Communist Party looked for answers to quell future unrest, moderate professor Tohti was among few Uyghurs with a direct line to the highest echelons of Chinese power.
But the government never listened to his surprisingly accurate and thoughtful warnings of “chaos” in Xinjiang, according to translations released over the past week and authenticated by ChinaChange.org.
The consequences have been dire. In October 2013, Tohti completed first-draft revisions of his assessment and recommendations for changes to repressive policies in Xinjiang. Fourteen months later, in January last year, he disappeared.
By the time Tohti faced trial and was sentenced to life in prison on separatism charges in September, a series of attacks by Muslim Uyghur separatists meant China was facing its bloodiest year in modern memory.
Overall, at least 500 people died in 2014 from attacks including one on the Kunming railway station last March. Tohti’s grim predictions for Xinjiang had sadly proven accurate.
“If the government does not change its thinking and tactics with respect to religious issues, I fear that religion will become the single biggest cause of ethnic strife and social discord in Xinjiang,” he wrote.
Other sections of his 24,000-word report paint a damning and illuminating picture of a region that has become increasingly shut off to the outside world by authorities as violence has escalated.
Tohti details the strict quotas on people entering each of Xinjiang’s roughly 24,000 mosques, black market trade in the Qur’an — pirated Uyghur-language copies sell for up to 80 yuan (about US$12) — and a lurch towards extremism.
By enacting increasingly strict requirements on Islamic dress, he wrote, authorities are only serving to turn ordinary Muslims into extremists, both in the way the government recognizes them and because of resulting resentment.
Since Tohti was imprisoned, Beijing has added a ban on burqas to the growing list of attire deemed illegal in Xinjiang.
“During religious services at mosques, it is not uncommon to see young people praying silently, with tears streaming down their faces. This is a social signal worthy of our close attention,” wrote Tohti.
He recommended that China allow imports of religious texts so that the trade is not pushed underground, the development of religious academia to international standards and a more transparent, less bureaucratic hajj registration process. Still most Uyghurs complain they will never get a chance to visit Mecca.
As the government in Beijing continues to blame violence in Xinjiang on religious extremism without looking at the causes, almost none of Tohti’s recommendations have been enacted.
Although the Xinjiang Islamic Institute announced a $48-million expansion plan last month, when completed in 2017 it will still only be able to train 1,000 students, or roughly one new religious leader each year for every 24 mosques in the region. It is the only official school for religious leaders in Xinjiang, a region where the vast majority of religious figures have no education beyond primary level.
What Tohti rightly urges overall is a lighter, more understanding touch from Beijing instead of the knee-jerk crackdown later shown by President Xi Jinping’s recent “strike-hard” campaign in Xinjiang.
Tohti’s call for pragmatism — never heeded — echoes problems facing many of China’s minorities. For example, the Dalai Lama — Tibet’s exiled spiritual leader — was earlier this month rebuffed in his calls for greater religious freedoms and more lenient rule.
In its defense, China has denied religious persecution, calling on hypocritical Western governments to stop interfering in its internal affairs. By implication, Beijing is rightly referring to the unsavory records of countries like the US, UK and Australia who have all enacted violent repression on ethnic minorities in recent centuries, both at home and in their current and former colonies.
But Chinese need only revert to the man who founded the People’s Republic as a guide for how to better manage still simmering ethnic tensions.
Chairman Mao’s famous speech in 1953 repeatedly warned of the dangers of “Han chauvinism” in China’s treatment of minorities four years after the Communists took power.
“It will be very dangerous if we fail now to give timely education and resolutely overcome Han chauvinism in the party and among the people,” Mao said. “The problem in the relations between nationalities which reveals itself in the party and among the people in many places is the existence of Han chauvinism to a serious degree and not just a matter of its vestiges.”
Sixty years later, Tohti’s sentiments were almost identical, and similarly ignored. If China is ever going to quell the cycle of uprisings and violence in its ethnic minority regions, surely Beijing needs to finally listen.
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In Hong Kong propaganda war, China plays waiting game
Analysis: Beijing hopes protest fatigue, commerce will defeat Occupy Central
<p>(AFP photo/Philippe Lopez)</p>
(AFP photo/Philippe Lopez)
Dan Long, Beijing
Hong Kong
September 30, 2014
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China's National Day could not have come at a worse time for Beijing. Following a lull in protests on Connaught Road and Causeway Bay on Tuesday afternoon, tens of thousands of people in Hong Kong are expected to join rallies on Wednesday as the Communist Party celebrates 65 years of rule on the mainland.
But can Occupy Central maintain its recent momentum? Beijing and Hong Kong's Chief Executive CY Leung clearly think not. They believe Occupy Central now finds itself in a difficult position after making the decision to withdrew riot police on Sunday following increasingly physical confrontations with protesters.
After protest leaders altered their stance from calling for dialogue with Leung to demanding his resignation, the chief executive responded on Tuesday by reminding protesters that if he steps down - or is forced aside by Beijing - a nominating committee will choose his replacement, as happened in 2012. In other words, protesters face a choice between two different brands of Chinese Communist-style “democracy”.
In withdrawing police, Leung has gained the upper hand for the time being. Firstly, Occupy Central said it would halt demonstrations if things got out of hand, which it is yet to do. Similarly, withdrawal of riot police plays into the pro-Beijing message that the lingering protesters are using physical intimidation and even violence against the authorities.
Propaganda is likely to be decisive: In East Asia, only the Japanese have a greater appetite for reading newspapers than Hong Kong's seven million people, and here again the authorities have an advantage.
Of the top-three newspapers in Hong Kong by circulation, two are pro-Beijing ‑ the free Headline Daily and the long-running Oriental Daily.
Mirroring the party line in mainland China, these papers have characterized Occupy Central as violent rule-breakers who represent an extreme minority. Many have also portrayed Occupy Central as a brainwashing force on vulnerable students who started their own protest last Monday.
Some have even created links between protest leaders and foreign meddlers, a favorite Communist Party strategy. Last week, the pro-Beijing Wen Wei Po newspaper accused student leader Joshua Wong, a Christian, of being manipulated by the American government.
This approach was echoed on Monday when the pro-Beijing Oriental Daily, which claims a circulation of half a million copies, drew parallels with the “color revolutions' in Eastern Europe.
“This is a game between powers against the bigger backdrop of the United States' 'pivot to the Asia-Pacific', and an inevitable result of Hong Kong's internal affairs under the influence of international politics,” it printed in an editorial.
Only the Apple Daily, a staunchly pro-democracy Chinese-language paper, has anywhere near the circulation to challenge the pro-Beijing papers in the ongoing propaganda war ­‑ last year it recorded over a quarter of a million daily readers.
It's a tough audience, however. In a city that boasts among the highest property prices ‑ and rents ‑ in the world, worrying about money comes before taking to the streets in protest. As such, people here are considered to have a lower threshold for long, disruptive rallies more commonly seen in cities including Bangkok and Kiev.
This is not lost on the Communist Party. The state-run China Daily, the highest circulation Chinese language newspaper in the world, ran a front-page article on Tuesday on the 1.9-percent decline on Hong Kong's stock exchange on Monday. It then went on to quote a 60-year-old woman who had problems going to a doctor's appointment because of the protests.
Whether or not some of the more far-fetched claims stick ‑ Apply Daily founder Jimmy Lai has been linked to the CIA, for instance ‑ is largely irrelevant.
Directly or through proxies and supporters, the Communist Party controls most of Hong Kong's media and its censorship shackles newspapers and television stations on the mainland. Its political control in both China and Hong Kong works in a similar way.
In biding its time and withdrawing riot police, authorities are clearly hoping that the protests will burn themselves out as an increasing majority is influenced by the anti-protest media messages that surround them and gets tired of disruption.
As the protests enter a critical phase, it's these challenges that will surely determine whether the pro-democracy movement can further test Beijing’s staunch resolve.
Dan Long is the pseudonym of a journalist based in Beijing who has reported on the region for more than a decade.

Uyghur Shot by Xinjiang Police in Extrajudicial Killing is Deemed Innocent


2015-04-24
Nine months after a police officer shot to death an unarmed Uyghur man in northwest China’s restive Xinjiang region, local authorities have said that the suspect never committed a crime against the government, although he was accused of being a “troublemaker.”
Memet Abdurehim, 26, was arrested on July 27 at his home in Aksu (in Chinese, Akesu) prefecture’s Shayar (Shaya) county by local policemen who detained him on suspicion that he was planning an attack against the government based on negative comments he posted on social media about the socioeconomic situation in his Shaya township.
But Eziz Toxti, chief of the county’s legal-political committee, told RFA’s Uyghur Service recently that Abdurehim had not been involved in any violent incidents or planned attacks on the local government.
“Our agents just found signs that he had thoughts about doing something against the government,” he said.
Abdurehim was captured without resistance after a police team surrounded his home, and had no weapons on his person when he was taken to the police station for interrogation, Toxti said.
“But all of a sudden he attempted to escape when they passed the town center, and the police thought he had done something wrong and became fearful,” he said. “They believed he might be considering doing something before he was jailed. That is why the police took extra action” and shot him dead.
Yet, despite an acknowledgement that Abdurehim had committed no crime, local authorities did not reverse a decision to promote the officer involved in the shooting or issue an apology or financial compensation to the victim’s family, sources said.
Eight days after Uyghur officer Turghun Mamut shot Abdurehim, he was promoted to deputy chief of his police station and received a 10,000-yuan (U.S. $1,600) award, while his Han Chinese partner Song Guannan received 7,000 yuan (U.S. $1,130), according to a report on the China News website on Aug. 5, 2014.
The article said Abdurehim threw objects at the police when he tried to escape, but Osman Tursun, chief of Yengibazar village of Shayar town where Abdurehim lived, said officers at the scene had checked his clothing and body when they had apprehended him.
Involved officers
When RFA contacted Mamut at the Shayar township police station, he confirmed that he had shot Abdurehim.
“But I have received an order from a higher authority about not giving interviews about the incident,” he said.”
When asked if he had received an order from higher up to shoot Abdurehim, Mamut said he had not.
“But we have many policies that demand and encourage us to take decisive action in response to suspects concerning political matters,” he said. “So, I didn’t wait for an order to shoot him.”
He then referred RFA to the county’s propaganda department for more details about the incident.
When RFA tried to reach Song Guannan, another officer at the Shayar police station said Song had been transferred to the station in Alar (in Chinese, Alaer), which is under the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, an economic and semi-military governmental organization in the region.
He said authorities had transferred Song either under the professional rank of police officer or police chief out of concern for his safety.
Osman Tursun, Yengibazar village chief, said Abdurehim had no any disputes with anyone, but he believes that he may have attended some meetings with his friends or spoke out against some issue in the village or township.
“But it is impossible that he made any statement or plan against the government,” Tursan told RFA.
No compensation for family
Authorities have also failed to compensate Abdurehim’s family or launch an investigation into his shooting death, despite confirming he had not committed a crime and that his attempt to escape did not constitute a threat to the safety of the police or the public, Tursan said.
The decision to promote Mamut was supposed to have been made after the conclusion of the case, he added.
“But I believe that the authorities were a little rushed when they did it,” he said. “That is way they couldn’t back away from the decision after they learned of Memet Abdurehim’s innocence.”
One local resident, who declined to be named, told RFA that Mamut was a “spineless man” who engaged in “heroic” actions against the suspect just because he knew the authorities were behind him.
He also said the authorities knew that Mamut did not have the ability to lead a police station, but they promoted him anyway “to encourage other Uyghur policemen to kill Uyghurs without hesitation.”
A Uyghur police officer told RFA that in the past two years Uyghur police officers had been hesitant or reluctant to use their guns because they knew that suspects could be their former classmates, neighbors or friends.
“That is why the authorities rewarded and promoted Turghun Mamut very quickly in six days without any investigation of the shooting,” he said. “Their goal was to attract and encourage Uyghur police officers to kill Uyghurs.”
Oppressive policies
The millions of mostly Muslim, Turkic-speaking Uyghurs in Xinjiang say they have long suffered ethnic discrimination, oppressive religious controls, and continued poverty and joblessness, blaming the problems on Chinese officials who set policy in the region and the influx of Han Chinese into the area.
Authorities have enforced security measures during the last couple of years in Xinjiang by cracking down on Uyghurs whom they accuse of terrorism and separatism.  
Uyghurs in Xinjiang and international Uyghur rights groups say Chinese authorities dictate heavy-handed rule in the region by curbing Islamic practices and the culture and language of the Uyghur people, as well as arbitrarily using lethal force against them.
Reported by Shohret Hoshur of RFA’s Uyghur Service. Translated by Shohret Hoshur. Written in English by Roseanne Gerin.
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Present-Day Ethnic Problems in Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region: Overview and Recommendations (2)


Continued from I. Unemployment
II. Bilingual Education
Overview
Besides unemployment, the issue that provokes the most intense reaction within Xinjiang’s Uighur community is the issue of bilingual education. In practice, “bilingual education” in Xinjiang has essentially become “monolingual education” (i.e. Mandarin-only education.) Within the Uighur community, there is a widespread belief that the government intends to establish an educational system based on written Chinese and rooted in the idea of “one language, one origin.” Suspicions abound that the government is using administrative means to exterminate Uighur culture and accelerate ethnic and cultural assimilation. With the mandatory implementation of so-called “bilingual education,” the Uighur language has become steadily marginalized, not only in the field of education but also in government administration, the judiciary, and other areas. Despite being one of the official languages of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, the Uighur language has long been deprived of the respect, attention, status and legal safeguards it deserves.
In practice, the greatest problem with bilingual education in Xinjiang is that it produces a large number of students who are proficient in neither their mother tongues nor in Mandarin. This has led to declining educational standards and difficulties for ethnical students, who dread attending school, to master subjects. The bilingual education system in Xinjiang mandates that physics, chemistry, biology, mathematics and other subjects be taught in Mandarin Chinese, which means that Uighur and other ethnic minority students are often unable to understand what they are being taught. This policy is responsible, to a large extent, for the steady increase in dropout rates for Uighur and other ethnic minority students. Another consequence is that many experienced Uighur primary school teachers have been forced into early retirement or made to leave their faculty positions for jobs unrelated to teaching. Thus, a large number of Uighur schoolteachers have become direct casualties of government policy on bilingual education.
“Bilingual education” in Xinjiang has increasingly given way to “monolingual education,” raising grave concerns and causing serious repercussions. This has the potential to spark a larger-scale Uighur rights movement aimed at defending Uighur language education and preventing the extermination of local language and culture. In recent years, Uighur fears of cultural and linguistic annihilation have been greatly exacerbated by a sharp contraction in Xinjiang’s local-language publishing and cultural industries.
This sudden dwindling of Xinjiang’s Uighur-language publishing and cultural industries has profound and far-reaching consequences. Not only does it threaten the demise of Uighur culture and the suppression of Uighur intellectuals, it has also caused vast swaths of the Uighur community, most of whom live in isolated rural areas, to become completely cut off from contemporary civilization. Southern Xinjiang, taken as a whole, is extremely backward: it is a geographical backwater of scattered, insular oases, and the vast majority of its Uighur inhabitants do not understand Chinese. For these reasons, the majority of households in southern Xinjiang are cut off from books, newspapers, radio broadcasts and television programs offering up-to-date information or news about the outside world.
This severing of communication channels means that, notwithstanding a small number of Uighur elites fluent in Chinese, most traditional Uighur communities are utterly deprived of access to contemporary news and information. In an increasingly competitive and open social environment, this makes Xinjiang’s traditional Uighur communities inherently less adaptable to external stimuli than traditional Han Chinese communities in other areas of China. When people are unable to attain the knowledge essential to a modern society, unable to cultivate strength of character for modern life, or to acquire healthy modern societal values such as rationality, tolerance and open-mindedness, they may find themselves in crisis, consumed by fear that they are being increasingly abandoned by modern society. The rapid disintegration of traditional society and the challenges of adapting to a new environment can leave people mired in ignorance, parochialism, savagery and despair.
Over the past ten years or so, traditional Uighur society has experienced an unprecedented surge in crime rates, the rapid disintegration of morals, and the spread of religious extremism and cultural conservatism. Add relative impoverishment and an increasing hatred of Han Chinese, and you have a vicious circle that intensifies day by day. It is this, combined with misguided government ethnic policies, that has allowed backward, ignorant, parochial, extremist, isolationist and fanatical ideologies to proliferate, creating a breeding ground for “the three forces” [of separatism, religious extremism and terrorism.]
Measures such as preaching national unity, making minorities reliant on government handouts, and accelerating the Sinification of China’s Uighur communities are not a sufficient bulwark against separatism, religious extremism and terrorism. Contrary to the common perception of Uighur cultural, educational and publishing industries as being too prone to strengthen Uighur ethnic and cultural awareness, it is only by allowing these industries to develop and thrive, to keep pace with the times and with history, that we can weaken “the three forces” [of terrorism, religious extremism and separatism] by denying them ground in which to take root. This is the only feasible long-term method by which to defeat them.
Therefore, we may say that the backwardness of Uighur cultural, educational and publishing industries is not only the enemy of Uighur society, but also the enemy of Han Chinese society.
In fact, nearly all Uighur families want their children to receive a better-quality education in Mandarin Chinese, and they feel that genuine “bilingual education” has come too late. Yet at the same time, the prevailing view and mainstream opinion in Uighur communities is that “Bilingual education should not come at the expense of one’s mother tongue.” Mandarin’s special status as China’s lingua franca should not make it an excuse for linguistic discrimination or forced linguistic assimilation. In a nation of diverse ethnicities, shared cultural values should be expressed in diverse ways, not subject to standardization or unification. Education should not be made the “executioner” of native languages and scripts.
As for why “bilingual education” in Xinjiang has devolved into “monolingual education,” the answer lies in the slapdash way in which bilingual education policy has been implemented:
1. Deficiencies in technical and basic preparations (i.e. finding qualified faculty, investing in school and facilities construction); inadequate consideration of regional differences and local needs; implementing educational policy in a “one size fits all” fashion.
2. Academic content and curricula that do not take into account either the specific academic needs of ethnic Uighur students, or the successful experiences of schools in China’s other ethnic regions.
3. Xinjiang’s limited allotment of teaching staff, poor infrastructure and low student academic abilities were scarcely sufficient for a monolingual education program, much less a full-scale bilingual education program.
4. Implementing “bilingual education” has actually exacerbated the educational funding gap between Han Chinese and Uygur students. For example, in the city of Atushi [also spelled Atush or Artux], the Han Chinese population numbers 22,725, the Uighur population 198,217, and the Kyrgyz population 29,186. If we do not count the Municipal No. 2 School, located forty kilometers outside of the city, Atushi has only three high schools: one Chinese-language school (Prefectural No. 2 High School) and two Uighur-language schools (Prefectural No. 1 High School, and Municipal No. 2 High School). Class sizes in the Uighur schools average more than 50 students per classroom, whereas the Chinese school averages only 30 students per class. Differences in teaching quality and levels of educational investment have widened the educational gap between Han Chinese and Uighur students, both in terms of their access to knowledge and their ability to master new subject matter.
Thoughts and Recommendations
1. Xinjiang needs true bilingual education. The [Korean-language] bilingual education program in Yanbian Autonomous Prefecture is a typical success story. Xinjiang can draw from that experience in restructuring its own bilingual educational content and curriculum.
2. In ethnic-minority populated areas, increase investment in the hardware and software required to provide true bilingual education, and redress the grievous imbalance in educational resources allocated to different ethnic groups.
3. Train qualified teachers. Currently, the biggest impediment to bilingual education is a serious shortage of qualified teachers. It will be difficult to alter this situation in the short term, but by focusing on systematic training of existing teachers, we can gradually reduce or dispel the regional disparities among teachers of bilingual education.
4. Exam-based university selection of minority students: although the current system of adding points to the university entrance exam scores of ethnic minority test-takers is in line with the central government policy of favoring minority candidates, in practice, many of the true beneficiaries of this preferential scoring system are academically-accomplished minority students who do not require preferential treatment, or even affluent, well-connected Han Chinese students. It might be possible to replace the “added points” section of the exam with test matter related to Xinjiang’s ethnic and cultural diversity. Not only would this signal to Uighur students that Xinjiang’s multi-ethnic and multi-cultural traditions have not been forgotten by the educational system, it would also deepen everyone’s understanding of Xinjiang’s ethnic and cultural diversity, thus shaping a richer and more inclusive national identity and consciousness.
5. Raise the number and prestige of ethnic minority cultural and publishing endeavors, in order to reverse the rapid decline of minority cultural industries. In terms of fiscal policy, increase government investment and support for ethnic minority cultural, educational and publishing industries, and accelerate Uighur-language participation and access to modern information technology. Both the regional and the central government should advance Uighur rural society by promoting knowledge about modern social life and modern production methods, and making this a key element in long-term planning.
With regard to Uighur folk culture, the government of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region should search for ways to encourage and support grassroots cultural initiatives in this field. The regional government should also begin experimenting with gradual reforms of the ethnic minority cultural and educational publishing industries: for example, introducing market-based mechanisms or objective quality targets, harnessing the initiative and enthusiasm of existing staff, and avoiding the current problem of overstaffing.
6. Increase regional or national government support for specialized research and scholarship on the social transformations affecting Uighur communities. Encourage the participation of mainland Chinese and even overseas scholars and academics, so that China’s rulers may draw on their collective wisdom and counsel to resolve the nation’s ethnic and social dilemmas. In mainland China at the moment, there is an almost complete dearth of worthwhile academic research on this topic. One hopes that if scholars are allowed more academic independence, it will help to fill this void.
7. Establish a plan and systematic targets for training a new breed of top-tier ethnic minority intellectuals, and incorporate them into national planning via funding for specially earmarked projects.
Xinjiang suffers from a dearth of ethnic minority intellectuals, at least those who meet the strict modern criteria for intellectuals. Moribund educational and research institutions and outmoded systems of personnel training and advancement have deprived Xinjiang of a true community of ethnic minority intellectuals. Whether the task is promoting social progress in Xinjiang, improving the lives of ethnic minorities, or advancing national identity and cohesion among minority elites, a highly qualified community of ethnic minority intellectuals is essential to the task. Allowing more ethnic minority intellectuals to enter the mainstream confers honor upon them and their communities, and that honor serves to strengthen their sense of national identity and cohesion.
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Xinjiang: Now the core, not the periphery of China’s growth and security concerns


By Peter Lee
April 26, 2015
There’s been rare good press for the PRC covering its initiative to promote security, economic growth, and sanity in “AfPak,” and there’s been the usual bad press concerning a vituperative PRC attack on three American historians on the seemingly esoteric question of “Manchu sinicization.”
The two issues are interrelated, and intersect in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region, which is inevitably and understandably described as “restive” thanks to friction between the indigenous Uyghurs and Han Chinese carpetbaggers.
The PRC’s enormous commitment to Pakistan – $46 billion worth of investment and infrastructure, clustered around a highway from Pakistan’s Gwadar port over the Himalayas to Kashgar, in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region – appears to be the real deal.  It’s not only backed up a visit by PRC supremo Xi Jinping; it complements the PRC’s overall “New Silk Road” strategy for Central and South Asia as the US draws down in Afghanistan and backs off from Pakistan (and pivots to the Pacific to balk the PRC’s maritime aggrandizement to the east).  Given the real and potential political and security vulnerabilities—will India stand idly by, or yield to the temptation to diddle? – it is big, risky bet on Pakistan.
It’s also a big, risky bet that elevates the Xinjiang Autonomous Region – basically the PRC’s northwest quadrant – from dissatisfied “Wild West” backwater to the northern anchor for the Gwadar project and the focus of PRC development, infrastructure, growth – and security – concerns.
Through great-power diplomacy and relentless pressure on its neighbors, the PRC has effectively neutralized the aggrieved Uyghur diaspora.  However, the PRC has not done a very good job of conciliating and co-opting the local Uyghur population in Xinjiang.  Security is implemented through an oppressive and unaccountable military apparatus, the “Bingtuan”; the local Party apparatus is largely run by cowed, co-opted, and/or mediocre hacks; and the region has been flooded by Han immigrants regarded as pushy and bigoted, creating a bifurcated society composed of a burgeoning Han sector and an increasingly marginalized Uyghur component.  Uyghur resentment has been intensified by religious and educational policies intended to undermine Uyghur identity, and economic and administrative policies apparently giving aid and comfort to the Han immigrants.
The PRC is unlikely to be swayed by calls to win Uyghur “hearts and minds” in order to secure the region for accelerated economic development.  The PRC has based its Xinjiang policy on the most conspicuous if unsavory successes in containing Muslim self-determination movements – Chechnya & Kashmir – which emphasized a maximalist and militarized gloves-off approach.
One genie the PRC is struggling to keep in the bottle is Uyghur nationalism, which threatens to integrate and intensify Uyghur determination across classes, regions, and educational levels to avenge injuries to their religious and cultural practices and their political and economic rights.
Paradoxically, the most striking result of PRC policies in Xinjiang has the development of “Uyghur” identity and solidarity, apparently in the countryside as well as in cities.
Despite proud historical moments like the “East Turkestan Republic”, which briefly ruled out of Kashgar in the early 20th century, traditional Turkic identity centered on the local tribe and its particular oases or towns.  In fact, one theory posits that the term “Uyghur” and indeed a considerable chunk of the Uyghur historical narrative is actually a manufactured artifact of the minority policy of the Soviet Union, which sought to create manageable ethnic blocs for its imperialist slicing and dicing in Central Asia.
Historical construct or no, as the PRC brutally knitted the Xinjiang region together economically, politically, and culturally, Uyghur self-identity and cohesion grew with it.  And as the Uyghur identity has strengthened, Uyghur nationalism has entrenched itself among educated and cosmopolitan Uyghurs, much to the CCP’s dismay.
Ilham Tohti, a high-profile Uyghur public intellectual with mild, conciliatory public views, was recently sentenced to “indefinite detention” on rather questionable charges, apparently because he had the temerity to present himself as a possible interlocutor between the PRC and the Uyghurs.
Concerns about Uyghur nationalism also provides a good explanation for an attack launched on three American scholars by a PRC historian-bureaucrat-ideologue, Li Zhiting on the website and in the journal of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.  Li assailed the scholars for advocating the “New Qing History”, which treats the Qing dynasty (the last one, which was overthrown in 1911) as a Manchu empire formed as the Manchu kingdom expanded from its base near the Korean peninsula to subdue China, Mongolia, and the western oases.
NQH appears to be at odds with preferred PRC historiography, which asserts that the Manchus overthrew the Ming and became “Sinicized” i.e. adopted Chinese culture and outlook as their own, and also claimed the Chinese imperial dowry, including the Tibetan, Mongolian, and central Asian territories.
This seemingly esoteric issue is very much the hot button in the PRC nowadays, a fact which I expects dismays the avowedly apolitical scholars of NQH.  Their critics fret that, if the Qing dynasty is regarded as a holding company for a portfolio of Manchu acquisitions that happened to place its capital in its richest, most populous, and most nettlesome subsidiary, China, Chinese suzerainty over the other Manchu conquests – like Xinjiang (which actually means “New Territories”, not quite a reassuring endorsement of the ancient lineage and legitimacy of China’s claim) might be called into question.
Manchurian nationalism is not a concern for the PRC.  In what Uyghurs probably consider a disturbing historical precedent, Manchu nationality, language, and culture were almost extinguished during the Republican period by a flood of immigration from Shandong and other Han provinces into the Manchu homeland.
Uyghur nationalism is another matter.  There are 10 million Uyghurs in Xinjiang.  They could turn the PRC’s strategic “Silk Road” into, well, “The Big Sandy Dead End.”  The CCP doesn’t want that to happen.  Judging by the Centre’s close attention to things Xinjiang under Xi Jinping, it is determined not to let it happen.
Xinjiang may well be the fulcrum upon which the PRC pivot towards the west turns.  It may also be the millstone upon which the PRC expects to disintegrate Uyghur national identity.
Peter Lee runs the China Matters blog. He writes on the intersection of U.S. policy with Asian and world affairs.
(Copyright 2015 Asia Times Holdings Limited, a duly registered Hong Kong company. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
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Uighurs suffer from continuous Chinese oppression


CIHANGIR YILDIRIM
ISTANBUL
2015-04-27
East Turkestan, known as the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, is located in northwest China. In the early 20th century, Uighurs used the name East Turkestan as an appellation for the whole of Xinjiang. The Uighur people reject the name Xinjiang since China aims to destroy the historical heritage of the Muslim population by changing the names of cities. Xinjang in Chinese means "gained territories." Therefore, the Uighur people prefer to use East Turkestan to emphasize connection to other westerly Turkic groups.
In 1921, China officially defined Uyghurs, the sedentary Turkic people from Chinese Turkestan, as part of their nation building policy in Central Asia. Multiple rebellions arose against China in the early 1930s throughout the region led by Chinese Muslims. In the Kashgar region on Nov. 12, 1933, Uyghurs declared the short-lived and self-proclaimed East Turkestan Republic. It is home to a number of ethnic groups including the Uighurs, Hans and Kazakhs.
The Uighur people have long suffered from human rights abuses, as 26.3 million people were killed between 1949-1965 and 8.7 million people have been killed since 1965. About 35 million people died because of the Chinese army's oppression or famine. China has applied the one-child policy since 1985. Chinese officials force women who have more than one child to have abortions. Wearing a headscarf in public, including on public transportation and when getting married in a religious ceremony, were banned in 2014, with fines of about TL 960 for wearing a headscarf in public. Radical behaviors are banned. The Chinese define not drinking alcohol, non-smoking and avoiding eating non-halal food as radical behaviors.
Chinese oppression of the Muslims of East Turkestan increases, especially in Ramadan. Public servants are banned from attending Ramadan iftar meals. According to local sources, if Muslims break the rule, they face the risk of loosing their jobs. Officials force Muslim restaurants to remain open all day in Ramadan.
The Chinese arrested Muslim youths for attending a religious ceremony in 1997. Then, some 15,000 East Turkestanis demonstrated to protest China and demanded the release of the arrested Muslim youths in Ghulja.
According to the World Uyghur Congress (WUC) reports, at least 100 were killed, and some 4,000 people were taken into custody. Also according to Amnesty International, some 90 people were untried but sentenced to life imprisonment by the court. Following the incident, one international NGO demanded the establishment of a commission to research the Ghulja massacre, but it was rejected by Chinese officials.
On June 26, 2005, two Uyghur workers at a toy factory were beaten to death by Chinese workers in Shaoguan, Guangdong (according to eyewitnesses, the number of deaths was 20). Then, tens of thousands of Uyghur Muslims hit the streets led by undergrads. The Chinese army fired into the crowd to disperse the protestors. According to Chinese media, 184 were killed and 1,680 were wounded in Urumqi. Also, some 1,400 Uyghurs were arrested. But according to Uyghur sources, at least 1,000 were killed. Moreover, World Uyghur Congress (WUC) leader Rabiye Kadir claimed that the number of deaths was 3,000.
The international community did not react strongly enough over the "Urumqi Massacre." The Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Right (OHCHR) expressed its concern about incidents in East Turkestan. The EU and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) called on the parties to stay calm. Also, statements by the U.S., France and Russia were not effective. The Turkish Prime Ministry described the events as "savageness" and called on the international community to demand that those responsible must be put on trial. Calls by Amnesty and the HRW to investigate the events were left unanswered by Chinese officials.
A professor of economy from Peking University, Ilham Tohti, was taken into custody in January 2014 for criticizing Chinese policy. He was not allowed to communicate with his relatives. He was tried in a non-public court in Urumqi. The court confiscated his property and sentenced him to life inprisonment.
According to a Uyghur Human Rights Project report, 700 people were killed due to political activities last year. The number of arrests increased by 95 percent compared to the previous year, reaching 27,000. The number of those sentenced to execution and life imprisonment increased by 50 percent in the last six months. Chinese officials continue to censor media in the region, with no freedom for reflecting in the press.
Over the massacres, NGOs in Turkey, including the East Turkestan Education and Solidarity Association, the East Turkistan Foundation, the Union of NGOs of the Islamic World, the East Turkestan Youth and Culture Association and the East Turkestan Immigrants Association held a joint press conference in Istanbul. They said: "The international community did nothing, did not react to the oppressive practices of China in East Turkestan and its settlement policies. The Chinese media distorted its reports of the events to the world. As in similar events before, Chinese media described the events as acts of organized terror. We want NGOs in Turkey, the UN, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the EU and Human Rights Watch (HRW) to ask China for information on the events, send an independent delegation to the region and force China to end its oppressive policies."
Chinese police have previously captured or killed ethnic Uyghurs from the far western Chinese region of Xinjiang who have tried to cross to other countries. In a recent incident, Chinese police shot dead two Uyghurs on the border with Vietnam, part of a group of people trying to sneak out of the country. Chinese authorities said that they worry that Uyghurs go abroad to link up with militants, but human rights groups said Uyghurs are fleeing persecution under harsh government policies.
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Present-Day Ethnic Problems in Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region: Overview and Recommendations (3) – Religion


By Ilham Tohti
translated by Cindy Carter
published: April 26, 2015
Continued from I. Unemployment and II. Bilingual Education
III. Religion
Overview                                                       
Since the July 2009 ethnic unrest in Xinjiang, religious fervor within China’s Uighur community has been rising steadily. Whether in traditional villages in southern Xinjiang, among urban officials and intellectuals, or even on college campuses in Beijing, there has been a quiet upsurge in religious conservatism—and the percentage of youthful conservative adherents is at an all-time high. Some observers have noted that, during religious services at mosques, it is not uncommon to see young people praying silently, with tears streaming down their faces. This is a social signal worthy of our close attention.
As an overt symbol of a people’s cultural and ethnic identity, religion comes second only to language; in the most extreme circumstances, religion can become the final spiritual refuge for a people.
The two most serious aspects of the religious problem in Xinjiang are as follows:
1. First is the enormous backlash generated by strict government controls on religion. Xinjiang’s south is home to approximately 24,000 mosques, and each mosque has a designated religious leader supported by the government: one cadre per mosque, responsible for denying admittance to outsiders, youths, or regular worshippers beyond the allotted quota. Such stringent controls display utter disregard for the feelings of believers, consume vast amounts of manpower and resources, and arouse great discontent among the citizenry.
 2. Second is the proliferation of underground religious activities, in marked contrast to the government’s failed religious policies of recent years. Ultra-conservative and xenophobic strains of religious thought imported from Afghanistan, Pakistan and other places are spreading rapidly in Xinjiang, and being disseminated via the religious underground. Increasing numbers of extremely conservatively dressed citizens attest to the popularity of this religious trend. In private, some Uighur intellectuals decry the new conservatism, complaining that Uighurs no longer dress like Uighurs, but like Arabs.
Although Xinjiang has no shortage of Kazakh- and Chinese-language versions of the Koran, Uighur-language versions of the Koran are not available for sale on the open market. This distinction could easily incline people to suspect that restrictive government religious policies are being targeted at a specific ethnic group. Some years ago, the Saudi king sent one million free copies of the Koran to Xinjiang, where they circulated freely among the local populace. After incidents of ethnic unrest in 1996 and 1997, these copies of the Koran were recalled; these days, a pirated copy of the Koran sells for between 50 and 80 Chinese yuan on the underground market.
Most Uighur intellectuals are wary of and opposed to extremist religious ideology. They recognize the contributions of Communist Party atheism and secular education in abolishing superstition, fanaticism and ignorance within the Uighur community. And yet the government’s current draconian religious policies in Xinjiang are repugnant to Uighur intellectuals, even to those most repelled by religious fanaticism.
Causes
Although the Chinese government is now much more tolerant of religious enthusiasm than it has been in the past, its long-standing adherence to atheism and lack of systematic research on religious issues means that, when confronted with issues involving religion, the government tends to find itself on the defensive.
Specifically, when it comes to dealing with religious issues in Xinjiang, official disdain for the special status of religion in ethnic minority communities makes it hard to see where government promotion of secularization ends, and the suppression of ethnic minority culture begins. Particularly with regard to Islam, the government tends to oscillate wildly between confidence and fear—confidence inspired by the machinery of the one-party state, and fear fueled by a basic lack of religious knowledge.
Since 1997, opposing “the three forces” [of terrorism, religious extremism and separatism] has been the paramount task of local government. Along the way, however, the policy of opposing religious extremism has morphed into a policy of opposing religious tradition and suppressing normal expressions of religious belief.
Recently, Xinjiang’s government has launched a vigorous propaganda push on the dangers of religious extremism, and it is on high alert against religious extremism and its effects. Extremist religious ideology is certainly unacceptable: even from an Islamic perspective, it is a distortion of traditional religious thought. But government policy in practice all too often veers toward rigid uniformity: indiscriminately lumping the wearing of headscarves, veils or beards into the same category as religious extremism, for example, or banning men with beards and women with veils or headscarves from entering buildings or public places. These and other persistent infringements on Uighur human rights are, to a large extent, responsible for creating antagonism between Uighurs and the government, thus amplifying Han-Uighur tensions.
While there is no denying that Xinjiang does indeed have a problem with religious extremism, it needs to be emphasized that extremist religious ideology has never dominated the mainstream in Uighur society, and its actual influence within the Uighur community is quite limited. More importantly, traditional Uighur culture has always displayed a marked resistance to extremist religious ideology. At present, the threat posed by religious extremism appears to be greatly exaggerated, both in government propaganda and in the public imagination. Enacting inappropriate control measures based on this flawed understanding will, objectively speaking, only drive people to embrace more extremist religious views. Moreover, when it comes to voicing criticism of extremist religious ideology, this criticism should come primarily from esteemed and learned leaders within the religious community, rather than from secular intellectuals speaking on matters outside their purview. And the minute details of citizens’ sartorial habits – clothes, beards, scarves and the like – should never be singled out for criticism.
In order to understand the problem of religious extremism in the Uighur community, we must recognize the following key points: (1) It is of great importance to clearly define what is extremist religious ideology and extremist religious behavior; (2) The goal of opposing extremist religious ideology should be to protect and safeguard normal, everyday religious activity; (3) Within Uighur society, religion was originally closely tied to cultural customs and traditions, but now religion has been stripped of its status and deprived of its traditional authority figures; (4) Uighur society has lost its mechanisms  for moral grounding and cultural adjustment; (5) There are no normal channels for positive voices to make themselves heard; and (6) In order to protect their posts and perks of office, some officials are more than willing to burn the wheat with the chaff.
Currently, Xinjiang’s coercive stability maintenance policies, particularly in the area of religion, are having a grave impact on the lives, jobs and mobility of Xinjiang’s Uighur population. If the government does not change its thinking and tactics with respect to religious issues, I fear that religion will become the single biggest cause of ethnic strife and social discord in Xinjiang.
Thoughts and Recommendations
The entire Islamic world, in fact, is being confronted with religious problems along the path to modernity. Turkey, Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and other countries have found different and successful ways to balance religion and modernity. There is no shame in learning from their successes or adopting their methods of dealing with religion, in much the same way that China, in the early days of economic reform and opening, looked to the West for experience and guidance.
  1. Establish institutional arrangements for the management of religious sites and places of worship. Places of worship offer a natural way for communities to bond, and the government can draw on foreign experience to develop standards governing the physical size, congregation size, social organization, etc. of places of worship. To facilitate the ability of citizens to practice their faith, the government should allow one place of worship to be built within each defined area or range. Each place of worship should also be equipped with clergy who have been officially recognized and certified by the government, in accordance with clear-cut rules and regulations. This will help to avert the proliferation of home-based and underground places of worship that have sprung up in response to draconian restrictions on the ordinary religious needs of citizens. In establishing such a system, it would not hurt to publicize the fact that some elements of the system were adopted from abroad (from a secular country such as Turkey, for example) in order to defuse opposition.
  1. Establish a system of religious training and certification for clergy members. There are some religious professionals who, despite their lack of certification or authority, still manage to attract adherents who believe them to possess religious wisdom. Professional clergy must complete systematic training and earn some official certification (for example, from the Islamic Association of China). In addition to systematic training in religious knowledge and scholarship, clergy should also possess some knowledge of the modern social sciences, to nurture a mindset that is open, progressive, and attuned to the needs of modern society. In particular, studying how religion and modern society interact and adapt in other countries and learning from their experiences will help provide clergy with a broader and more open-minded perspective.
Regarding the vocational and educational training of clergy, a long-range, well-organized system of religious training should be established in collaboration with top-tier institutions of religious learning in Xinjiang, nationwide and even overseas, in order to gradually train a core group of erudite and broad-minded clergy. In addition, allowing local institutions of religious learning such as the Xinjiang Islamic Institute to strengthen communication and ties with other institutions of religious learning at home and abroad will bolster the quality of local religious scholarship.
  1. To satisfy public demand for religious texts, allow the legal importation and publication of overseas editions of contemporary religious texts. Uighur-language versions of religious texts are nearly impossible to find in Xinjiang today; the copies that do circulate underground are generally smuggled in from Afghanistan, Pakistan or Saudi Arabia. But in fact, Turkey, Malaysia and other successful secular Islamic nations have long been compiling and codifying contemporary editions of religious texts that have not only met the religious needs of their citizens, but also helped to usher in more open and modern societal values. If the government were to organize the translation and publication of these religious texts from abroad, it would satisfy the religious needs of the local community, impede the underground market for extremist religious publications, and promote the spread of moderate, open and inclusive religious values.
  1. Improve research and investment in religion. China is a country with a vast Muslim population, but Chinese religious scholarship that meets modern academic standards of quality, particularly scholarship pertaining to Islam, is virtually nonexistent. China should have prestigious Islamic Institutes, as well as other respected institutions dedicated to the study of Islam. The government should also encourage non-Muslim scholars to participate in religious research and scholarship that satisfies the needs of religious believers and religious scholarship, and meets the demands of social development and transformation. Lastly, increasing research and investment in religion will serve to amplify China’s voice in the Islamic world and allow it to play a more active role.
  1. Leverage the influence of religion in traditional society to positive effect. For communities steeped in religious tradition, the clergy are an irreplaceable and profoundly influential component of society. Particularly in the comparatively insular, economically underdeveloped, and culturally conservative rural communities of southern Xinjiang, the best ways to disseminate modern ideas and information are via the market and via religion.
Indeed, religious leaders have also been thinking about how to address the issue of social transformation. The government has nothing to lose by creating the conditions and opportunities for the clergy to join in this effort, allowing them to contribute their experience, intelligence, wisdom, and considerable social influence. Religious leaders and ordinary citizens alike do not want to see a society plagued by unrest, chaos or hatred. Religion is the pursuit of virtue, after all, and religious leaders are cautious and conservative by nature. Instead of their voices being suppressed, they should be allowed to take their rightful place in the public discourse, so that they may use their own language to offer comfort and consolation to their community.
  1. Make policy regarding the Hajj [the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca] more transparent and open. It would be fair to call the Hajj policy one of the greatest failures of religious policy in Xinjiang. Simply put, the Hajj is something that all devout Muslims aspire to; completing the pilgrimage to Mecca imbues a person with a certain amount of social prestige upon their return, but it does not cause them to become extremist or fanatical. At present, there are stringent bureaucratic criteria for being allowed to go on the Hajj, but this bureaucratic process need not be so opaque. Every year, Saudi Arabia issues quotas for the number of pilgrims allowed from each country. In Xinjiang, only a lucky few meet the qualifications. The quota process could certainly be carried out in a much more open and transparent manner: for example, by publicizing China’s quota and explaining how this quota is allocated. As it stands, the quota system has bred serious bureaucratic corruption and has aroused intense feelings in ethnic minority communities.

I. Unemployment and II. Bilingual Education
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